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This paper tackles the complex issue of how to include regenerating 
indigenous forest in a domestic carbon credit system. The paper specifically 
addresses New  Zealand conditions but most of the issues and conclusions are 
relevant in any developed country with indigenous regrowth. The paper begins by 
defining the constraints that any sink policy must meet. I begin by discussing 
environmental integrity, and in particular measurement and monitoring, “human-
induced” change, and permanence. I then outline the international rules as they 
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Around 2.6 million hectares of land in New Zealand are estimated to be 
in the process of reversion to indigenous forest.
1 A significant percentage of this 
land is Māori-owned. Currently this land provides erosion control, biodiversity 
benefits and cultural benefits as well as having value as a firewood supply. It 
provides little or no financial return. 
This land is found primarily in poorer rural parts of the country, East 
Cape, Northland, and Taranaki. The lack of economic return is a concern to the 
landowners and also to the wider community. These are regions the government 
has identified as especially deprived.
2 Although the land is currently reverting to 
native forest, with no economic return, if economic conditions change it may be 
cleared again and the environmental benefits may be lost. 
The Kyoto Protocol, and concern about global climate change more 
generally, provides an opportunity for a modest return on this land. After 2008, 
land that was not in forest in 1990 could be eligible for payments as the forest 
regenerates and sequesters carbon. The government intends to ratify the Protocol 
but the domestic policies to implement it are still highly uncertain. 
A high percentage of the reversion of New Zealand land to indigenous 
forest is occurring as a result of the economic reforms in the 1980s that lowered 
the return to agriculture on marginal land, as well as Cyclone Bola (1989), which 
damaged a lot of marginal land in the East Cape region. This means that a 
reasonable percentage was effectively not in forest in 1990. Just to give a ballpark 
figure, if all 2.6m hectares of regenerating land were eligible for carbon credits, 
carbon were sequestered at a rate of 5.5 tonnes of CO2 per hectare per annum and 
international carbon prices in the Kyoto trading regime were around $8.20 per 
tonne of CO2, indigenous forests could yield an annual income of up to $117m.
3 
A considerable percentage of this could go to Māori. 
                                                           
1 Ministry for the Environment 2000. 
2 See Dave Maré, Peter Mawson and Jason Timmins 2001. 
3 The estimate of 5.5 tonnes of CO2 per hectare is drawn from G. M. J. Hall 2001. One tonne of 
carbon is equivalent to 3.667 tonnes of carbon dioxide. 
1 The carbon return to indigenous forest provides an extra land use 
option. It is unlikely to be valuable enough to displace plantation forestry or 
pastoral agriculture where these are feasible options. It is most relevant for 
marginal land that is unused at present or barely used. 
This situation offers a valuable opportunity for Māori to gain a return 
on currently unused land, discourage clearing and hence promote cultural values, 
control erosion and floods and protect and enhance biodiversity. The erosion 
benefits are particularly salient in East Cape, where most marginal land is highly 
erodible. The challenges are to ensure that the domestic regulations are designed 
appropriately to maximise the benefit from this opportunity and to set up 
mechanisms that allow fair and efficient access to the opportunity. 
The issues I discuss in this paper are also highly relevant to plantation 
forestry, which might also receive carbon payments, but I focus on indigenous 
forests here. Many of the conclusions I draw will be relevant, but there are some 
differences.   
Māori land creates opportunities and challenges that are not present on 
non-Māori land and that require special thought. Māori have a strong desire to 
maintain control and ownership of their land and assets. This makes them 
suspicious of contracts to protect land in perpetuity. They are also concerned that 
if they protect the land it could become part of the Department of Conservation 
estate or locked up by local councils as Protected Natural Areas under the 
Resource Management Act. This requires care in contract design. Many Māori 
landowners are already protecting land under "Ngā Whenua Rahui" (similar to 
QEII Trust) in which land is covenanted for 25 years, and then there is a renewed 
kawenata (agreement) with landowners. They have found ways to provide 
effective protection using a mechanism that Māori trust. Domestic policy needs to 
allow for temporary sequestration and storage to allow these mechanisms to be 
used. 
Māori land creates issues also in terms of the complexity of governance 
structures on multiply-owned land and limited ability to borrow, as well as low 
capacity to negotiate and administer contracts. To the extent that sequestering 
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carbon is technically a relatively non-challenging activity that requires little 
capital investment, it has an advantage relative to other land uses. 
The purpose of this paper is to design feasible carbon sequestration, or 
“sink”, policies that are likely to meet the constraints and achieve the goals of 
current and future international climate change rules. The paper begins by 
defining the underlying constraints that international climate change rules must 
meet. I discuss environmental integrity and in particular measurement and 
monitoring, “human-induced” change and permanence. I then outline the 
international rules as they stand and how these could be translated into domestic 
rules. This paper is written primarily for a non-economics audience so I have tried 
to make it as non-technical as possible.   
2  Environmental constraints on policy 
design 
The environmental constraints will eventually be defined in 
international and domestic regulations but are also intrinsic to the nature of the 
climate change problem we aim to address. Sequestration of carbon in “sinks” that 
create tradeable credits needs to have the same atmospheric effect as the emission 
reductions that the credits would replace. The amount of credits given for sink 
enhancement should depend only on the additional carbon that is removed from 
the atmosphere (or not put in) and when the carbon is removed. 
2.1  Measurement of sinks 
The basis for environmental integrity is accurate measurement of the 
carbon stored or added to sinks. At a global scale what is important is that 
measurement is unbiased so that the amount credited globally is accurate. Large 
errors in specific places are not important as long as they go in both directions and 
do not lead to global bias and too many (or too few) credits being created. Overall 
bias will lead atmospheric concentrations to be different than envisaged in the 
agreement. 
Ensuring fairness across countries requires more accurate measurement 
so that each country's total sink credits accurately reflect the real sinks created. 
Again, as long as the national total is accurate, it does not matter if the 
methodology used to generate this is not accurate for each specific area within the 
3 country. Current inventory methodologies are designed in this way. Errors are 
made but they average out over large areas so the national total is pretty accurate. 
These inventories are currently taken using a combination of remotely sensed and 
aerial imagery, plot sampling and models of carbon accumulation with limited 
differentiation of carbon storage across space. 
The problem becomes more challenging if we want to measure carbon 
more accurately at a local level. Simply put, the smaller the area where we require 
accuracy, the more costly and difficult it is. The gains from accurate measurement 
are obvious: more equity across landowners and more accurately focused 
incentives to enhance carbon stocks. The costs of accurate measurement are high 
costs of monitoring and compliance. These have to be traded off against each 
other. When the carbon price is relatively low, the compliance costs are likely to 
dominate and less accurate methods are probably preferred. As carbon prices rise, 
more accurate methods will become worthwhile. 
The sink credits need to be verified at regular intervals. Verification 
could involve varying degrees of accuracy. It may be that only the existence of the 
forest is monitored in some periods, rather than auditing the carbon content of 
those forests. 
If involvement in the domestic program were voluntary and project 
monitoring stopped for any reason, for example the carbon price dropped and the 
project wasn't worth continuing, the buyer would have to pay all net accrued 
credits back. Voluntary involvement is discussed further below. Monitoring is a 
requirement of credit creation and maintenance because otherwise compliance 
cannot be established. Because sinks can be destroyed, monitoring must be 
ongoing. As long as no carbon release occurs and monitoring continues, the 
credits would remain valid. 
2.2  Additionality: Human-induced change 
The only real global environmental gains are increases in sinks relative 
to the level that would have been there otherwise. The ideal regulatory system 
would identify what would have happened without regulation and only reward 
activities that go beyond that. In practice this is extremely difficult to do as it 
requires predicting human behaviour that we will never observe. 
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Figure 1 shows an example of two scenarios. In the lower line, no effort 
is exerted to sequester carbon or protect regenerating forest. For reasons unrelated 
to climate change land is reverting to scrub and forest and the level of carbon in 
the terrestrial ecosystem is gradually rising. At some point it falls, possibly 
because of a fire or a change in land use when beef or lamb prices rise, but then it 
rises again. 
Figure 1: Additional sequestration from human-induced activities 













The higher line is a scenario where the land is actively being protected. 
Weeds are controlled, animals are kept off the land and the rate of sequestration is 
higher than under simple abandonment. In addition fires are suppressed, and land 
does not return to pastoral uses when the prices receivable from alternative land 
uses rise, therefore ensuring that the level of carbon does not fall. Overall the level 
of carbon is higher than it would have been. This should be rewarded to encourage 
more carbon sequestration. 
Any policy has to include a “baseline” against which gains are 
measured. This lower line, “what would have happened otherwise” would be the 
ideal baseline if government wishes to maximise its revenue without 
compromising efficiency. We cannot ever observe the lower line, so need to set it 
somewhat arbitrarily when defining policy.
4 When making this choice we need to 
                                                           
4 Suzi Kerr, Shuguang Liu, Alex Pfaff and R. Flint Hughes 2003 discuss the way baselines could 
be estimated for tropical forests. Suzi Kerr, Joanna Hendy and Alexander S.P. Pfaff 2003 discuss 
the implications of the uncertainty these baselines involve. Similar approaches could be 
implemented in New Zealand. This is the purpose of a major Motu project, details of which can be 
found at www.motu.org.nz/land_use_nz.htm. 
5 consider the different costs of making the baseline too high or too low (see 
Section 3.3.3). 
In the international rules, the baseline is defined so that any forests 
established after 1990 are “additional” while all forests established before 1990 
are assumed to be maintained.
5 In New  Zealand this is probably a “lower” 
baseline than would really happen because the area in both plantation and 
indigenous forests is continuing to increase for reasons unrelated to Kyoto. This 
expansion in forest area is a common historical experience in developed countries 
and even in more advanced developing countries. The issues relating to how these 
international rules should be translated into domestic policy are addressed further 
below (Section 3.3.3). 
2.3  Timing and permanence of credits 
One simple form of sink project is a permanent sink where forest is 
carefully protected and the land is convenanted forever. In this case it would be 
possible to estimate the total sequestration over the infinite life of the project. If 
projects were like this it would seem simple to issue credits equal to the total 
anticipated sequestration at the beginning of the project. No further action would 
be required. 
This approach has several disadvantages, however. The greenhouse gas 
(GHG) benefits from land use change can be lost or reversed over time, unlike the 
GHG benefits from emissions reductions in other sectors. First, up-front credit 
allocation does not take account of unavoidable risk to the project. Fire, slips, 
earthquakes and even global climate change can cause loss of carbon storage.  
Initial estimates of the carbon to be stored could be incorrect. These problems 
could be dealt with through appropriate insurance, by the landowner or 
government as long as the land owner cannot unduly affect the risks. 
Second however, and more importantly, the landowner may want to 
retain the ability to change their mind about their land use. Forever is a long time. 
If crop prices or technology change so that profitable land use options emerge, or 
                                                           
5 This is the rule under Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol. Under Article 3.4, existing forests can be 
rewarded if they sequester more carbon during each year of the commitment period than they were 
sequestering in 1990. Article 3.4 is unlikely to be applied in New Zealand in the first commitment 
period.  
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if the cultural values of successive owners have different emphasis, the landowner 
might desire to change the land use. They may want this to be possible without 
breaching a contract.  
In any case, up-front allocation of credits puts all the risk of changes on 
the environment or the government (if they are unable to enforce landowner 
liability). It also violates the principle that increases in emissions should be offset 
by increases in sequestration in the same time period. Credits should be issued as 
the carbon is stored and not earlier.
6
An effective permanence rule should be designed to reflect the 
following equivalences: 
•  One ton of permanent sequestration/storage from land-use activities is 
directly equivalent to one ton of avoided fossil fuel emissions (e.g. 
efficient lighting). 
•  The release of one ton of emissions from land-use activities (e.g. 
burning forest) is directly equivalent to one ton of emissions from fossil 
fuel. 
The potential crediting systems for sinks should be compared in terms 
of how they affect atmospheric GHG levels at every point in time.
7 This principle 
of environmental integrity means that any risk from reversibility should be borne 
                                                           
6 This issue is discussed in the context of the international negotiations in Suzi Kerr and Catherine 
R. Leining 2000, Suzi Kerr 2001 and Catherine Leining and Suzi Kerr 2001.  K. M. Chomitz 1998 
and 2000 and Colombia 2000 advocate a similar approach, as do many others. 
7 Some people have argued that the decay of emissions should mean that the amount of land-use 
carbon needed to offset a one-time emission would fall over time. If this were true, however, it 
would also be true of all other emission reductions. Therefore, all credits would convey not only 
the immediate right to emit an equivalent amount but also the right to continue to emit as the initial 
emissions were removed from the atmosphere. If we do not treat emission reduction credits this 
way, then we should not treat land-use credits this way either. This is a question about the timing 
of net changes in atmospheric CO2 and, at least within Annex I, Kyoto negotiators have chosen to 
treat emissions reductions and sinks as equivalent if they occur at the same time. The removal of 
atmospheric emissions through the global carbon cycle should be dealt with through appropriate 
choice of targets for different commitment periods aimed at achieving certain atmospheric 
concentrations at each point in time. Papers that propose and discuss issues relating to the 
appropriate international rules include L. Dobes, I. Enting and c. Mitchell 1998, P.M. Fearnside, 
D.A. Lashof, and P. Moura Costa 2000, J. P. MacLaren 2000, G. B. Marland, B. Schlamadinger, 
and P. Leiby 1997, M. Meinshausen and B. Hare 2000, P. Moura Costa and C. Wilson 2000, R. 
Schwarze and J-O. Niles 2000, B. Schlamadinger and G. Marland 2000, R. A. Sedjo and M. 
Toman 2001, R. A. Sedjo, G. Marland and K. Fruit 2001 and G.C. Van Kooten, A. Grainger, E. 
Ley, G. Marland, and B. Solberg 1997.  
7 by the buyer and/or seller (as determined in the project contract), not by the 
environment. 
A net increase in carbon stocks relative to the baseline during each 
crediting period would be awarded credits. These credits could be maintained in a 
registry, or sold or used by the buyer to achieve domestic compliance. During 
each crediting period, any net loss of previously credited carbon stocks would 
require payback of credits by the buyer or lessor (if the credits are leased not 
sold). Under a compliance system where credits are retired when project benefits 
are lost or reversed, environmental integrity can be maintained without requiring 
that credits be permanent or that forest be protected forever. 
Why does it matter when GHGs are removed from the atmosphere 
given the long lifetime of CO2? It is important for credibility (will the reductions 
ever actually occur) and efficiency under fixed targets (reductions today are worth 
more than reductions tomorrow with a binding cap today). We cannot borrow in 
an unrestricted way from banks on the basis of a simple promise to repay; nor 
should we borrow from the environment when our ability to repay is highly 
uncertain. As long as we base other climate regulation on caps on net emissions 
during a specified time period (as Kyoto does), net sink emissions should be 
treated equivalently so that the credits created are fungible (i.e. can be used 
interchangeably with credits released by emissions reductions). 
Any regulatory system for sink credits should have the following 
characteristics: 
•  As sequestration/avoided release occurs, credits are generated and can 
be sold or leased. 
•  Sink credits should be verified at least once per commitment period 
with mandatory payback of credits by the sink credit holder during the 
commitment period when credited carbon stocks are lost or monitoring 
ceases, whichever comes first. 
3  International rules and domestic policy 
design 
In this section I outline the international rules defined in Kyoto and 
discuss how these could be translated into domestic regulations. This is not 
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intended to be a definitive discussion of domestic sinks policy but aims to outline 
the key issues and offer a straw-man solution. Without this it is difficult to talk in 
a concrete way about projects. These regulations will constrain the way buyers 
and sellers can define project contracts. Looking at it more positively, however, if 
the rules are made as simple as possible they also define the many opportunities 
for different approaches possible within the minimal constraints of policy. 
3.1 International  rules 
The international rules deal with the problems of monitoring, 
additionality and timing in the following ways. They still leave considerable 
flexibility in the domestic approach and even more flexibility in design of 
individual contracts. 
The relevant article for New Zealand sequestration credits in the first 
commitment period is Article 3.3. This is the article that outlines how countries 
may claim credit for afforestation and reforestation activities on land that was not 
in forest on 31 December 1989 (i.e. “Kyoto Forests”). The credit is given for 
carbon sequestration that occurs on that land between 2008 and 2012. In addition, 
it mandates that countries take responsibility for deforestation anywhere in the 
country during the commitment period.
8
Countries have some leeway in the definition of “forest” but have to be 
consistent once they have chosen a definition. The definition of a “forest” is 
critical for indigenous reversion, though less so for plantation forest, which 
probably fits most reasonable definitions. The government has chosen to define it 
as an area of a least 1 ha, with at least 30% canopy cover and able to reach a 
height of 5m at maturity.
9 Young stands, natural or plantation, that have the 
potential to become forest, are classified as forest. For NZ the critical issue is 
whether “scrub” is classified as forest. If scrub is classified as forest, areas that 
were in scrub in 1990 are not eligible for credit under Article 3.3 but are liable as 
net sources if the scrub is cleared. If scrub is not classified as forest, areas that are 
                                                           
8 If a Kyoto Forest is cut before 2012, the carbon credits lost cannot be greater than those gained 
for sequestration during the period 2008–2012,  i.e. there will be no punishment for reforesting 
land after 1990 but then cutting it down before 2012. This is relevant to some NZ plantation 
forests and also applies to regenerating native forests.  
9 New Zealand Climate Change Programme, 2002, p. 42.  
9 in scrub during 2008–2012 would receive no credit for carbon sequestration from 
2008–2012 because they would not be forest. They would need to be included 
under Article 3.4. 
Article 3.4 relates to revegetation (establishment of vegetation that is 
not a potential forest), forest management, cropland management, and grazing 
land management. These are not the focus of the current paper. 
3.1.1 Monitoring 
At the international level, monitoring requirements are largely defined 
by IPCC best practice guidance and the definitions above. Land use change can be 
monitored using remote sensing or survey information. The rules require 
monitoring at a resolution no less than 1 ha, but actual monitoring (particularly 
back to 1990) may be constrained by data availability. 
Currently carbon stocks and sequestration rates in different types of 
land use (above ground and below ground stocks) are modelled with the aim of 
being correct on average but not necessarily correct for specific plots. The science 
continues to improve but a high level of uncertainty remains. NZ is required to 
report at five-yearly intervals so will probably create inventories using remote 
sensing images each five years (i.e. in 2008 and then the end of each commitment 
period). 
3.1.2 Additionality 
The additionality issue has been addressed in Article 3.3 by defining 
Kyoto forests relative to land use in 1990. Forests already established in 1990 are 
assumed to stay in that land use in future (and are liable for emissions after 2008 
if they do not). Implicitly the rules assume that no new land would have gone into 
forest after 1990 without climate change pressure. For New Zealand this is a “too 
low” baseline. Our area in forest was growing independent of climate change 
policy. The extra credits we will gain may be roughly compensated for by higher 
emissions reduction targets in future. In any case, NZ might not have agreed to its 
Kyoto target without this relatively generous sinks baseline. 
3.1.3  Timing and permanence 
The international rules provide credit only as carbon is sequestered, i.e. 
not in anticipation.  Any reversal of sequestration, as well as removal of existing 
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forests, is accounted for by the requirement to report net sinks, which are defined 
as carbon sequestration from reforestation/afforestation net of loss of carbon 
through deforestation. 
3.2  Potential domestic rules 
If Kyoto comes into force, we need to design a domestic regulatory 
system that aids national compliance with our targets. We have considerable 
flexibility in regulatory design. In this paper I am primarily interested in the 
constraints that may be placed on private contracts to sequester carbon in 
exchange for credits. 
Our aims when designing the domestic regulation can include the 
following: 
•  national compliance with Kyoto 
•  efficient incentives for sequestration 
•  minimising compliance costs—e.g. monitoring and reporting 
•  maximising flexibility in compliance to maximise efficiency and 
landowner/user control 
•  fairness in distribution of costs and benefits of the regulation 
•  simplicity 
•  maximising ancillary benefits. 
New  Zealand Kyoto forests are forecast to provide roughly enough 
credits to offset growth in CO2 and methane emissions, making our overall target 
non-binding. With careful policy design they could contribute even beyond this if 
the response to regulation provides benefits greater than the costs. They could also 
assist with compliance in future commitment periods, from 2012 forward. 
Efficient incentives could lead to planting or regeneration of additional 
Kyoto forests and could encourage landowners not to convert existing forest back 
to pastoral and other uses. Efficient incentives require first that carbon gains are 
measured with reasonable accuracy and second that the agent rewarded for carbon 
gains can directly or indirectly influence whether those gains are achieved. A 
perfectly efficient system would need to have comprehensive coverage of all 
forests. 
11 Compliance costs are a key issue here. Monitoring both land use and 
carbon and tracking large numbers of agents could be costly both to government 
and to the agents themselves. There will be tradeoffs between accuracy and 
comprehensive coverage on the one hand and costs of administering the regulation 
on the other. Strategic choice of the point of obligation, centralised monitoring 
and use of existing information (such as forest inventories), and voluntary 
participation of small players could reduce administrative/compliance costs with 
relatively small efficiency costs. If the system is non-comprehensive, the problem 
of leakage can arise, however. 
Maximising flexibility is closely linked to efficiency but also related to 
minimising compliance costs. If a range of compliance options is available and 
carefully structured, landowners can choose the way that they comply and 
simultaneously make appropriate societal tradeoffs between efficiency and 
compliance costs. 
Fairness in distribution of costs depends largely on whether high 
compliance costs are imposed on small agents and on how the baseline is set and 
hence the free credits are allocated. It also depends on the accuracy of 
measurement and reward. If baselines are variable, some agents are not included 
in the system, or credits are accurate on average but not in specific places, two 
agents who in reality create the same number of credits could receive quite 
different rewards. This is unfair and also has efficiency implications. Improving 
fairness may have to be traded off against reducing compliance costs. If agents 
can choose to forefeit gains or take risks in the accuracy of return in exchange for 
lower compliance costs they may not be upset about the differences in rewards 
that result.
10
Subject to achieving environmental integrity, the rule should maintain 
maximum flexibility in how the credits are created and hence achieve maximum 
economic efficiency in climate mitigation. If two rules achieve the same ends both 
environmentally and economically and one is simpler than the other, the simpler 
rule would be preferred. 
                                                           
10 Some small forest owners in New Zealand claim that they do not want to be involved, largely 
because of their perception of compliance costs.  
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3.3  Critical design elements for domestic regulation 
Three key decisions need to be made. Where is the “point of 
obligation”? Who monitors and how? What is the baseline—who owns the 
credits? 
3.3.1  Point of obligation 
This could be the government, the land user or the landowner. The 
appropriate choice may vary between indigenous forest and plantation forest and 
by block size. As far as possible the obligation should be put on people/legal 
entities who jointly comprehensively cover all sequestration and deforestation (i.e. 
all forest and potential forest) in New Zealand and can influence sequestration on 
the land, either directly or through contracts with the land user. At the same time 
we need to minimise the number of agents required to report and choose those 
who can report with least cost (possibly because they already collect inventory 
information). 
The government can indirectly influence sequestration by, for example, 
providing tax rebates for forestry, enhancing or restricting access to marginal land, 
and/or facilitating the process of covenanting land reverting to native forest. The 
government could expand the national parks or regional reserve system, or local 
government could use the Resource Management Act to influence local land use. 
These are relatively crude instruments. Government cannot send an effective price 
signal to efficiently reward sequestration if it maintains control. 
The current land user (e.g. a forest concession holder) has almost 
complete control in the short run but it may be difficult to track them through time 
as contracts change. They may also have limited long-term control of the land or 
their control may be contractually limited to their current land use. Landowners 
have control of land use in the long term as their existing contracts with land users 
roll over. However, there is an unwieldy number of land owners. 
One option would be to make the system voluntary or, alternatively, 
compulsory for large landowners/users but voluntary for smaller ones.   
Government would maintain the residual rights and obligations. This approach is 
commonly used in pollution control where there are some large sources and then a 
large number of very small sources. Rules are set for opt-in to the system. 
13 Landowners/users who choose to include their pieces of land would need to meet 
monitoring requirements or subcontract those to government (see 3.3.2). They 
would be able to claim credits and would also be liable for emissions from 
deforestation. A baseline level of sequestration would need to be established—this 
could be as simple as the levels of carbon in Kyoto forests and the area of non-
Kyoto forest at the date of entry. 
Once a landowner/user opts to include a piece of land and receive credit 
they would need to keep reporting as long as they did not want to pay back all the 
credit received.
11 Voluntary participation by small players reduces compliance 
costs and encourages broadening of the system but also creates bias because 
opting in is a strategic act. Those who opt in will tend to be those who will gain 
from the system.
12 A similar problem that arises in monitoring is discussed below. 
Wherever the point of obligation is placed, positive price signals 
encouraging more planting and more use of wood will be passed up and down the 
supply chain. A more comprehensive system with a greater percentage of the 
obligation placed on those who control land use will lead to more efficient price 
signals.
13   
3.3.2  Who monitors and how? 
The lowest cost monitoring option would be for government to combine 
remotely-sensed maps of land use and cadastral maps of property boundaries to 
determine changes in land use and then use their carbon models based on a 
random sample of audited sites to estimate net carbon sequestration. This would 
be consistent with national-level reporting, and would be relatively unbiased. The 
disadvantage would be that it would be quite inaccurate, particularly for small 
areas and areas with unusual sequestration patterns (e.g. extremely fertile land or 
                                                           
11 The government would probably not want to allow them to claim back net payments they had 
made for emissions if they opt out. This would exacerbate selection issues.   
12 Opt-in was allowed in the US Acid Rain program for controlling SO2 emissions from electric 
utilities. Juan Pablo Montero 1999 discusses the effect this had on environmental integrity.  
13 This needs to be compared with the case in CO2 emissions where many potential points of 
obligation are available: fossil fuel importers and producers, large energy users, consumers of 
energy-intensive products, or consumers of retail gasoline. This is because fossil fuel use is a near 
perfect proxy for CO2 emissions. As long as the obligation is comprehensive the efficient price 
signals will occur. Any agent who controls the use of fossil fuel or products with embodied fossil 
fuel at any point can indirectly control CO2 emissions. The choice here is to minimise compliance 
costs.  
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if the landowner has enhanced the forest). A way to address this would be to allow 
landowners to choose to have their carbon levels audited if they think it will 
provide a higher payment. They could then trade off the cost of the audit against 
the value of extra payments. 
An alternative would be for landowners to report their own changes in 
land use. This could be randomly audited with remote sensing or ground truthing. 
If the total were inconsistent with the national-level reporting, adjustments could 
be made to all domestic credits (e.g. increasing or decreasing the quantity to 
account for bias). These reports of land use change could be translated into 
sequestration using government models, or alternatively landowners could pay for 
more accurate, certified audits if they chose. 
Accepting estimates from land owners would create a bias in total 
carbon credits claimed because only those who have higher than average modeled 
sequestration would opt to provide alternative figures. Therefore, those who opt to 
provide their own estimates would always claim more credits than the government 
would have given them. The average credits provided on all other land may need 
to be adjusted downward to keep the domestic total and the internationally 
reported totals consistent. Land where landowners did not opt to provide their 
own carbon sequestration numbers will tend to be lower carbon producing land 
but may also include small land parcels. Owners of small parcels will not choose 
to provide alternative figures because the cost would outweigh any gains. Thus 
this system would create some inequity. 
3.3.3  What is the baseline for domestic credits—i.e. who owns the 
credits? 
The international rules set one baseline—all credits from post-1990 
forests belong to New Zealand. The domestic baseline does not need to be the 
same. In this case there is no environmental impact—total international credits 
will be the same however it is done domestically. 
Two tradeoffs are involved. The first is between economic efficiency, 
which generally biases toward primarily government ownership, and equity, 
which might lead some credits to be allocated to groups of landowners such as 
Māori. Equity and political feasibility might lead some credits to be allocated to 
land/forest owners. Second (at a finer level), if most credits are being claimed by 
15 groups other than the landowner/user, when choosing the exact level of baseline 
there is a trade-off between our ability to freely allocate credits and efficiency in 
sequestration. 
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Figure 2 breaks the total amount of carbon credits into three stocks. 
Within the lowest stock, Stock 1, the issue is simply about who should benefit 
from this windfall gain to New Zealand. Within Stock 2, the equity issues are 
made a little more complex because landowners may have protected forest in 
response to expectations about Kyoto and might feel they have a strong argument 
for being rewarded even though there are no direct incentive effects. There may 
be indirect incentive effects through building trust that government will reward 
those who create benefit for New  Zealand. Within Stock 3 there are clear 
efficiency arguments. By both equity and efficiency criteria, these should belong 
to those who control the land. The greatest challenge is to identify where the line 
falls between Stocks 2 and 3. I will discuss the issues relating to ownership of 
each of these stocks separately below. 
Stock 1: Why is primary government ownership of carbon credits 
probably most economically efficient? 
Allocation of the credits that arise solely because of historical activity 
does not affect the cost of producing extra output or the prices that landowners 
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face when making decisions; therefore it has no direct impact on economic 
activity. However great an incentive forest/landowners get, they cannot change 
their previous behaviour so the allocation of credits will have no impact on their 
earlier actions. They can't change their previous behaviour and it won't affect their 
future behaviour. 
The benefit from government ownership of carbon credits arises from 
something called “revenue recycling”. If the government can raise revenue 
without adverse impacts on economic activity and use that revenue to cut taxes 
that do create distortions and costs, New Zealand will gain. Income taxes, GST 
and corporate taxes cause inefficient changes in behaviour. For example, with 
higher income taxes (say 33%) it is less worthwhile for a worker to take on 
overtime work because she will receive only 67 cents out of each dollar of value 
she creates. Society would like her to work, and so would she if she received the 
full reward, but she might choose not to because of the tax. 
The government needs to fund its activities. If it can receive revenue 
without causing distortion, as it could from carbon credits, it needs to raise less 
money from taxes and could lower them. This has potentially large economic 
efficiency benefits. In the US, C. L. Ballard, J. B. Shoven and J. Whalley (1985) 
estimate that each $1 of government revenue from taxes costs around $1.30 to 
raise. If indigenous forests can create 71.5m tonnes of carbon dioxide over 5 years 
and each of those tonnes is worth $8.20, then the government can get revenue of 
$585m and the efficiency gain from using that revenue to cut taxes could be as 
high as $175m.
14 The potential gains from government ownership of carbon 
credits from Kyoto plantation forests are an order of magnitude higher still. 
A particular case may arise with potential Māori ownership of carbon 
credits. If Māori currently need to fund their community activities through 
government payments or through expensive fundraising within the community, 
there may be efficiency gains from providing them with a more direct revenue 
source. Revenue recycling gains of a sort may be achieved here too. 
                                                           
14 The 71.5m tonnes of CO2 is based on the area of regenerating forest (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2000) and an estimate of average annual carbon sequestration from Hall, 2001.  
17 The arguments against government ownership arise from concerns 
about how government uses extra revenue. If the government spends the money in 
unproductive ways rather than using it to cut taxes, these potential gains may not 
be realised.
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Stock 1: What is the most equitable way to allocate carbon credits? 
These efficiency arguments do not mean that it is most equitable for 
government to claim all credits arising from previous activity, or that this is what 
they should do. In particular there may be a strong Māori claim for part of the 
credits, particularly those arising on Māori land. 
The first equity argument depends on who bears the cost of the 
regulation and whether there is an equity argument on this basis for landowners or 
landusers to receive some of the credits. Landowners and forest owners as a group 
could win from inclusion of indigenous forests in a carbon credit system as long 
as they do not convert too much pre-1990 forest land back to other non-forest 
uses. With government ownership, if taxes are lowered, all New  Zealand 
taxpayers will benefit. This may relate reasonably closely to fair compensation for 
the costs of Kyoto regulation of fossil-fuel emissions which will tend to be widely 
dispersed across all consumers. There is no obvious equity argument here. 
The major arguments against government ownership derive from the 
problem that carbon is essentially an unowned property right. In a similar way to 
arguments over the ultimate ownership of fisheries when the ITQ system was 
created in 1986 (Te Ohu Kai Moana, 2000), it is not clear that government has the 
right to appropriate this new resource.  
In some ways it is similar to the claim for the telecommunications 
spectrum. Carbon credits are not something that existed in the past so it's not 
immediately obvious that they belong to anyone in particular. It's also similar to 
the fisheries quota in some ways—while the fish always had value, during the 
time that anyone could fish there was no value in being able to fish, so that right 
did not clearly belong to anyone. This is not an economic issue, so I have no 
insight to provide on these arguments. 
                                                           
15 For a New Zealand example of loss of efficiency gains through unproductive government 
expenditure see Davis and Fabling (2002). 
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The allocation of sink credits will have significant impacts on the 
distribution of wealth in New Zealand (as will the allocation of any other carbon 
credits). Because of this, allocation will be hotly contested, but this is primarily a 
political and equity argument, not an economic argument. 
Stock 2: Rewards for early action 
The basic economic arguments here are the same as for Stock 1 because 
these are actions that have already been taken. The equity issue is slightly 
different because some landowners and forest owners might have in good faith 
invested in forests with the idea that they will contribute not only profit but also 
carbon sequestration which will have environmental benefits. This was relatively 
unlikely in 1990 but becomes more likely in more recent years and is clearly true 
on land that is involved in the Emissions and Biodiversity Exchange (EBEX) run 
by Landcare Research. It is hard to separate Stocks 1 and 2 but errors have 
primarily distributional implications. If the government wants to reward this 
essentially altruistic (or optimistic) behaviour to encourage these people to do 
more in future it could find it compelling to give them some share of credits even 
if they are based on historical activities. 
Stock 3:  Ownership of “additional” carbon credits. 
Even if government successfully claims ownership for Stock 1 and even 
2, this does not mean that they should claim all credits. In particular, if 
landowners or forest owners create additional forests they should be rewarded for 
this by receiving any extra credits. The regulation should be designed to reward 
any activities that sequester carbon above the baseline. We would expect that with 
this regulatory system more forests will be planted (or indigenous forests be 
protected and allowed to regenerate). This is an efficiency issue central to 
regulatory design. 
The real gain for New Zealand from here on out will come if land and 
forest owners plant and protect more forest than they would have without Kyoto. 
Forest areas may be expanding anyway but if they expand even more because of 
appropriate incentives, that will bring gains to NZ. The really additional gain to 
New  Zealand only comes by them doing things from now to 2012 that they 
wouldn't have done otherwise. If this means the rewards per hectare of new forest 
19 are small in the first commitment period because the trees grow slowly, that is 
because there is relatively little gain to NZ. We want to set up a system so that the 
person making decisions about forestry faces the same reward (incentive) as NZ 
as a whole when they make new decisions (about either planting or harvesting). 
If the government is to successfully claim Stocks 1 and 2, it must face 
the difficult problem of setting a baseline that will encourage additional carbon 
sequestration but not reward historical sequestration. If the baseline is set too low, 
landowners and/or forest owners will receive a windfall and be rewarded for 
actions they have already taken and the government loses potential revenue. 
In contrast, if the baseline is set too high people could actively protect 
and regenerate forest and receive no reward. This would decrease their incentive 
to do so. An opportunity for local environmental gain and to reduce greenhouse 
gas concentrations efficiently would be lost. 
This problem is different for indigenous forests than for plantation 
forests. With plantation forests, once they are planted they are unlikely to be 
harvested before maturity, so we can predict sequestration between 2008 and 2012 
fairly accurately. A baseline where forests planted after 2000 are rewarded would 
create relatively small windfall gains and be unlikely to lead to any incentive 
problems. As long as forests planted in the 90s never face a liability greater than 
the credits they create their owners will have no incentive to harvest early. In 
contrast, indigenous forests are not protected for profit in the absence of carbon 
credits. They could be cleared at any time if a different land use is preferred. This 
makes it harder to set a baseline without risking loss of appropriate incentives. 
Covenants complicate this issue. If a permanent covenant was placed on 
the land before 1990 it is unlikely that it will be cleared, so sequestration will not 
need to be rewarded. If a temporary covenant was placed on the land, particularly 
after 1990, it is unclear how likely the land is to be cleared and how the baseline 
should be set. With a temporary covenant the land may be cleared when it ends. In 
addition, equity issues arise because those who placed covenants on land after 
1990 are more likely to have been responding to climate change and maybe even 
acting in expectation of later credit. Although they cannot change their behaviour 
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now, they may claim the rights to carbon credits from that land with some 
justification. 
In no case does the setting of the domestic baseline affect international 
greenhouse gas environmental integrity. The international rules that define the 
carbon credits NZ receives are fixed. 
3.3.3.a  Key points on baselines for indigenous forest 
Indigenous forests must be included in the regulatory framework if 
landowners are to receive credit for additional forest they allow to regenerate. 
Economic efficiency generally argues for government ownership. This 
might be less true in the case of indigenous forests because: 
•  Māori may use the revenue from credits to replace other funding 
demands on government or their people, leading to “revenue recycling” 
benefits 
•  It is very difficult to define a baseline for indigenous forests that 
separates actions that would have occurred without Kyoto from those 
induced by Kyoto because indigenous scrub/forest could be cleared at 
any time. 
Indigenous forests are a resource with considerable value even at 
moderate carbon prices (maybe $585m). Ownership of the carbon credits from 
these forests is not yet established. Māori could probably argue for at least partial 
ownership of these credits on Treaty/equity grounds. 
3.3.4  Special issues pre-2008 
Even if the Kyoto Protocol comes into force, there will be no formal 
Kyoto credit for carbon before 2008. Two scenarios are possible. First, voluntary 
action by companies and individuals could create some demand for credits in the 
way they are being created now under EBEX. Second, government could create 
an “early action” programme to provide domestic credit for pre-2008 activities. 
Companies and individuals have paid for carbon credits since the mid-
1990s. They have been motivated by a number of factors including positive 
publicity, concern about biodiversity, erosion of cultural values associated with 
forests, and an attempt to influence the future course of government regulation. 
21 These trades also have provided a chance to experiment and learn how to set up 
such contracts by actually doing it. Many of the actors involved either as buyers or 
facilitators have been non-profit environmental groups. This has been a thin 
market with very few trades and generally low prices but very high dispersion of 
prices. It mostly depends on goodwill. This market could easily continue until 
2008 and may strengthen as Kyoto comes closer and becomes more certain. 
The government is free to set up domestic regulation to encourage sink 
enhancement and protection at any time. The key issues are who would pay for 
these credits and what the net effect on New Zealanders' welfare would be. One 
argument in favour of “early action” is that people are myopic or unduly risk 
averse so they will not make investment decisions in forests that appropriately 
reflect potential future returns from credits post-2008. This argues that 
government is better able to make investment decisions than the individuals 
directly involved. This would be true if government has better information about 
its intentions or the international political situation. A second argument is that we 
need to engage in learning by doing before 2008 so that we have an effective 
regulation in place to take advantages of opportunities after 2008. In general, 
when a new technology or opportunity arises it takes time to be adopted because 
people may not know about its potential, and there may be uncertainty about how 
profitable it would be. Costs tend to fall over time. If this process can be hastened 
effectively through demonstration projects that would have benefits. 
The arguments against early action are essentially that it imposes costs.  
If the government simply creates a fund that can be used to reward sequestration 
there are costs to taxpayers. The benefits would have to clearly justify this. If the 
government goes further and creates a full carbon regulatory system before 2008 
(as some countries in Europe are going to) emitting sectors will bear costs. Output 
and employment would fall in some sectors and the costs of some consumer 
goods would rise. There would also be direct administrative costs of creating the 
system, though some of these would be offset by lower costs in 2008 if the early 
action system mimicked the system that would be used after 2008. 
In New Zealand we are in the unusual situation where if we placed a 
total cap on net emissions at 1990 levels between now and 2008 this would be 
more or less non-binding. Total emissions are very similar to total sequestration. 
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A capped domestic trading system would have a zero carbon price and no real 
effect. To be effective we would have to start selling credits to other countries (as 
part of their own early action programmes) or impose a more stringent cap than 
we will face under Kyoto. 
4 Conclusion 
Creating an effective domestic policy to encourage indigenous regrowth 
for its carbon benefits is complex. We have stressed three major issues. On 
measurement and monitoring of carbon, the existence of forest needs to be 
monitored as long as the credits are valid. Carbon can be directly measured on-site 
or modelled. The smaller the project is, the more expensive monitoring would be 
per hectare to achieve accuracy. The cheapest and nationally most accurate option 
would be to have government take responsibility for measuring carbon and use a 
national model. This would, however, have drawbacks in terms of the incentives 
individual landowners and users face. The appropriate resolution of the tradeoff 
between compliance costs and efficiency of incentives should depend on the value 
of the carbon and hence will change over time. 
The ownership of sequestration credits is the second big issue. 
Essentially this is a tradeoff between having all New Zealanders benefit from this 
new highly valuable resource and providing incentives for landowners/users to 
enhance the resource by making sure they gain additional benefit created through 
their actions. 
The third issue is the lack of permanence of sink credits. I argue that 
this is a perceived problem rather than a real one. Careful policy design can allow 
temporary sequestration credits, which leave the landowner controlling the future 
use of their land (this is particularly important for Māori), while protecting the 
government against liability if the land is later cleared. 
Another key point that is highly relevant to Māori is whether 
regenerating indigenous forests (scrub) should be included as forest. This provides 
an opportunity for gain if forests regenerate but creates a liability if they are cut. 
The balance is probably positive so that it would be beneficial to include it. A 
second key point is that ownership of the carbon credits associated with this scrub 
is not yet established. A strong case needs to be made especially for those credits 
23 arising on Māori land. This case should be distinguished from ownership of 
credits arising from plantation forests. 
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